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Abstract 
A key source of support for the view that challenging people’s beliefs about free will may 
undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors 
reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased 
cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this 
influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 
283, N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) 
anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our 
primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the 
same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original 
studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs 
in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed 
link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests.  
 
Key words:  
Free will, skepticism, moral behavior, cheating, replication 
 
1. Introduction 
Many scientists over the past two decades have become increasingly vocal about their 
skepticism concerning free will and responsibility (e.g., Bargh, 2008; Cashmore, 2010; Greene 
& Cohen, 2004; Harris, 2012; Haynes, 2011; Montague, 2008; Ogletree & Oberle, 2008; 
Wegner, 2003; 2008; cf. Baumeister, 2008; Walter, 2001). With articles covering such 





captured the public imagination. One recurring theme in this public discourse is that recent 
scientific advances (especially in neuroscience) may threaten our traditional picture of agency 
and responsibility. Whether this really is the case is a complicated metaphysical question that 
we will not attempt to answer in this paper. Instead, we are interested in the possible 
ramifications of people believing that this is the case as free will skepticism becomes more 
mainstream. 
One potential ramification of the expanding profile of free will skepticism is that it may 
negatively affect moral behavior. The best-known support for this view comes from two 
classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008) reporting that exposure to certain prompts which 
suggest that free will is an illusion subsequently increased the proportion of cheating behavior 
among study participants. As the authors wrote, “The fact that brief exposure to a message 
asserting that there is no such thing as free will can increase … cheating raises the concern 
that advocating a deterministic worldview could undermine moral behavior” (Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008, p. 53). Indeed, if public pronouncements concerning the death of free will or 
the ascendency of deterministic, mechanistic, and reductionistic explanations of human 
behavior have the downstream consequence of increasing the prevalence of immoral 
behavior, this might give free will skeptics grounds for not attempting to publicize their views.  
As Vohs and Schooler acknowledge, nothing about their studies speaks to the truth of 
free will skepticism. It is possible that the skeptics are right that free will is an illusion. 
However, as Vohs and Schooler note, “it is possible that free will is an illusion that 
nevertheless offers some functionality” in encouraging moral behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 
2008, p. 53). If true, then communicating specific views about free will in the public sphere 





increases the likelihood of unethical actions, then identifying approaches for insulating the 
public against this danger becomes imperative” (Vohs & Schooler, 2008, p. 54).  
But before we start worrying too much about the practical upshot of disbelieving in 
free will, we need to make sure that the findings from Vohs and Schooler are reliable. In the 
following section, we describe the methods and findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) in 
detail. Then we provide an overview of the wider body of evidence bearing on their results. 
Following that, we report our own recent attempts to replicate this influential and widely 
cited work. As we will see, the purported relationship between disbelieving in free will and 
immoral behavior is more elusive than researchers have assumed. 
1.1. The Vohs and Schooler (2008) Paradigm 
In Study 1 from Vohs and Schooler (2008), N = 30 participants (distributed across two 
conditions) were presented with one of two excerpts from Francis Crick’s The Astonishing 
Hypothesis (1994). In the Anti-FW condition, participations read an excerpt that was 
deterministic, reductionistic, and skeptical about free will. In the Control condition, 
participants read an excerpt about consciousness that did not touch on free will. After reading 
their respective primes, participants responded to the unpublished version of the Free Will 
and Determinism Scale (FAD, Paulhus & Margesson, 1994) and to the Positive and Negative 
Affectivity Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which Vohs and Schooler used 
as a measure of mood.  
For the second stage of the study, participants performed a computer-based mental-
arithmetic task involving 20 problems after being informed that they would be paid for each 
problem they solved correctly. They were then told that “the computer had a programming 
glitch and the correct answer would appear on the screen while they were attempting to solve 





bar after the problem appeared” (Vohs and Schooler, 2008, p. 50). Participants were also told 
that “although the experimenter would not know whether they had pressed the space bar, they 
should try to solve the problems honestly, on their own” (Vohs & Schooler, 2008, p. 50).  
The main findings from Study 1 were as follows: (a) scores on the Free Will subscale 
from FAD were significantly lower in the Anti-FW condition (d = 1.20),1 (b) scores on the other 
three subscales of FAD (Fate, Scientific Causation, and Chance) showed no statistically 
significant differences between conditions, (c) participants cheated more frequently in the 
Anti-FW  condition (d = .88), and (d) mood did not differ significantly across conditions. Vohs 
and Schooler took these results to provide a partial answer to their initial question.  
One shortcoming of Study 1, acknowledged by Vohs and Schooler, is that it relied on 
a passive cheating paradigm in which cheating was the default option. To overcome this 
limitation, Vohs and Schooler adopted an active cheating paradigm for Study 2 (see below). 
They also adopted a new set of prompts. For this round, they included N = 122 participants 
(distributed across five conditions). Rather than presenting participants with excerpts from 
Crick’s book, they used a series of 15 statements based on the mood induction method 
developed by Velten (1968)—with each statement being displayed for 1 minute. There were 
three basic cheating-possible conditions—(a) pro-free will, (b) pro-determinism, and (c) 
neutral. After reading the 15 statements and being asked to think about their significance, 
participants in the cheating-possible conditions were once again presented with FAD and 
PANAS. Then, as in Study 1, participants were told they were going to take part in a second, 
independent experiment.  
 






For Study 2, Vohs and Schooler followed Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) in using an 
active cheating paradigm. For this part of the study, participants received a set of 15 reading-
comprehension, mathematical, and logical reasoning problems that were taken from the 
Graduate Record Examination (GRE)—a task which had been previously demonstrated to 
provide participants with a challenging but solvable set of problems (Schmeichel, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2003). Participants were told that that they would receive $1 for each problem 
they answered correctly. At this point, Vohs and Schooler used a ruse to make it possible for 
participants to cheat in a context where it was clear that they couldn’t be caught.  
 In addition to this cheating-possible condition, Vohs and Schooler also ran two control 
conditions that did not allow for cheating. In the first non-cheating condition, participants did 
not read the Velten statements nor did they respond to FAD or PANAS. Instead, they simply 
completed the 15 item GRE task (without the ruse and without the opportunity to cheat), 
providing a neutral baseline for performance on the task. In the second no-cheating condition, 
participants received the 15 pro-determinism items before completing the 15 item GRE task. 
The goal of this condition was to enable Vohs and Schooler to determine whether the pro-
determinism items by themselves increased performance on the GRE items, thereby 
controlling for a potential confound. 
 The results were as follows: (a) scores on the Free Will subscale were higher in the 
pro-free will condition than in the neutral condition (d = .51),2  (b) scores on the Free Will 
subscale were lower in the pro-determinism condition than in the neutral condition (d = 1.46),  
(c) scores on the Scientific Causation subscale were higher in the pro-determinism condition 
than in the pro-free will or neutral conditions (d = .80),  (d) scores on the Fate and Chance 
 





subscales did not significantly differ by condition, (e) participants in the pro-determinism 
cheating condition walked away with more money than participants in the other four 
conditions (d = .84),  (f) the higher people’s scores on the Free Will subscale, the less they 
paid themselves, and (g) mood did not significantly differ across conditions. Based on these 
results, Vohs and Schooler concluded that free will beliefs influence moral behavior. Not only 
was take-home pay higher in the determinism cheating-possible condition than in all of the 
other cheating-possible conditions, but it was also higher than the pay in the determinism 
non-cheating condition. Taken together, these results suggest that free will skepticism could 
influence people’s moral behavior. 
1.2. Related Work and Recent Findings 
Several studies have built upon the Vohs and Schooler (2008) results. In multiple studies, free 
will beliefs have been associated with increased performance in domains of value. For 
instance, these beliefs have been associated with higher levels of autonomy and proactivity 
(Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013), greater self-efficacy and less perceived 
helplessness (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012), better academic performance (Feldman, 
Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016), increased satisfaction with decision-making and choices 
(Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014), endorsement of dispositional explanations of 
behavior over situational explanations (Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017), improved feelings 
of belonging, self-control, and meaningfulness (Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilberg, 2007), 
improved learning from negative emotions (Stillman & Baumeister, 2010), and more positive 
ratings from work supervisors and higher job approval ratings (Stillman et al., 2010). As for 
the relationship between free will beliefs and explicitly moral behavior or attitudes, 





increased helpfulness towards strangers (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009), greater 
epistemic and ethical humility (Earp, Everett, Nadelhoffer, Caruso, Shariff, & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2019), heightened moral judgments and attributions of blame and punishment 
(Krueger, Hoffman, Walter, & Grafman, 2013; Martin, Rigoni, & Vohs, 2017; Shariff et al., 
2014), and more morally responsible behavior, self-control, pursuing and accomplishing 
goals, and conscious thought and deliberation (Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011).3 
Although many of these findings have yet to be replicated, they do appear to bolster 
the earlier work by Vohs and Schooler in highlighting the various ways that believing in free 
will may be associated with positive traits or prosocial behavior while disbelieving in free will 
may be associated with negative traits and antisocial or (otherwise) immoral behavior. 
However, none of the studies just cited is a direct or very close replication of the work by 
Vohs and Schooler, which makes it hard to draw firm conclusions about the overall strength 
of evidence in support of their view. Instead, the above-cited studies are conceptual 
replications—that is, studies that depart from the original design and materials, often in 
substantive ways, typically to assess the generalizability of the underlying idea.  
Given widespread publication bias against negative findings within psychology and the 
associated “file drawer” problem (Doyen et al., 2014; Earp, 2017; Greenwald, 1975; 
Rosenthal, 1979), this raises a problem for how the results of such studies should be taken to 
bear on the original findings. In a nutshell, extension studies such as conceptual replications 
tend to be published when they show effects that are theoretically consistent with previously 
published findings, but tend not to be published when they fail to show such effects (Doyen 
 
3 It is worth mentioning that Caspar et al. (2017) recently found that decreased free will beliefs were associated 
with pro-social, not anti-social, behavior. Moreover, Mercier et al. (n.d.) found that free will beliefs are 
associated with greater endorsement of economic inequality. These findings cut against the narrative of free 





et al., 2014). After all, such failure can often plausibly be attributed to the methodological 
departure in the conceptual replication, rather than to any weakness in the original result or 
paradigm, leaving their results ambiguous. Therefore, in order to assess the robustness of 
originally reported phenomena, direct or close replications are needed (Doyen et al., 2014; 
LeBel et al., 2018).  
Until recently, psychologists did not spend as much time as they should thinking about 
replication (for an overview, see Earp & Trafimow, 2015). But this has started to change in 
light of a series of critical papers, including a landmark publication in Science in 2015 by the 
Open Science Collaboration project (OSC, 2015). The team selected 100 studies from four 
high-impact psychology journals for purposes of replication, reporting  an overall success rate 
of just 41% (see Earp, 2016, for discussion). That so few high-profile studies replicated was 
taken by many to indicate that the field of psychology was experiencing a crisis.4 
One set of findings that failed to replicate were those by Vohs and Schooler.5 At the 
time, the Vohs and Schooler studies were the most widely cited out of the 100 studies the 
OSC tried to replicate. If this were the only time researchers had a difficult time replicating 
these results, there might not be much cause for concern. For, just as we should not take a 
single original report of a finding as conclusive evidence that it exists and is reliable, nor 
 
4 Given that many people seem to be under the impression that the situation in psychology is uniquely bad with 
respect to replication, it is worth noting that apparent problems with replication seem to cut across many 
disciplines, with reports that 40% of economics experiments fail replication (Camerer, Dreber et al. 2016), and 
that only 11% of findings in haematology and oncology replicate (Belgley & Ellis 2012; note that the ongoing 
project on the replication of oncology research has produced much more encouraging, though still very mixed, 
results:  Errington, Iorns et al. 2014). Conversely, in cognitive psychology, tiny p values (e.g. p < .001) and better 
replicability are not uncommon (Scholl, 2017). Some fields, such as experimental philosophy, seem to have fared 
better, with a 73% success rate reported by Cova et al. (2018). But there are ongoing debates about the criteria 
that should be used to judge whether (and in what sense) a replication attempt has been successful (for a 
philosophical analysis, see Earp, in press), so all of these estimates must be taken with a grain of salt.  
5 Researchers were unable to manipulate free will beliefs using the prompts used by Vohs and Schooler and they 






should we take a single apparently unsuccessful replication attempt as invalidating the 
original result. Especially when using Null Hypothesis Significance Testing and p-values, a 
series of high-quality, close or direct replications is typically required to get a meaningful 
sense of the underlying evidence (LeBel et al., 2018; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Trafimow & Earp, 
2016; 2017).  It is therefore worth emphasizing that, to date, several other attempts to 
conceptually replicate and extend the basic findings of Vohs and Schooler have yielded 
inconsistent findings—either failing to successfully manipulate free will beliefs or failing to 
find that successfully manipulating them consistently influences moral behavior (e.g., Crone 
& Levy, 2018; Monroe, Brady, & Malle, 2016; Schooler et al., 2014).6  
 So, where does that leave us? As we have seen, a number of studies have conceptually 
replicated and extended certain aspects of the findings by Vohs and Schooler (2008), at least 
when it comes to the relationship between free will beliefs and moral or prosocial behavior 
(of one sort or another). However, attempts to more directly or closely replicate the original 
findings have yielded mixed results. Even Vohs and Schooler have subsequently admitted that 
the relationship between free will beliefs and moral behavior is more elusive than they 
originally assumed (Schooler et al., 2014, p. 89). Given the outsized influence that the Vohs 
and Schooler findings have had—having been cited 850 times in the academic literature since 
2008 and widely referenced in the popular press in venues like The Atlantic, The Guardian, 
New York Times, The Smithsonian, and Scientific American (to name a few)—we believe that 
these findings merit more critical attention.  
2. Present Research 
 






We tried to faithfully replicate the results of Vohs and Schooler (2008) with a series of five 
studies, four of these being both high-powered and pre-registered. For Studies 1 and 4, we 
used the Velten statements from Vohs and Schooler (2008) and attempted only to influence 
free will beliefs (not moral behavior). For Studies 2 and 3, we used the Crick statements from 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) and attempted to replicate the behavioral findings using an online 
version of the active cheating paradigm from Vohs and Schooler (2008). Finally, for Study 5, 
we combined the Velten statements with the active cheating paradigm. In all studies, we 
measured free will beliefs using FAD+ and mood using either PANAS or the Brief Mood 
Introspection Scale (BMIS: Mayer & Gaschke, 1988).7 Moreover, in presenting all studies, we 
follow best scientific practices by reporting how our sample sizes were determined, which 
data were excluded and why, all manipulations, and all measures included in the study 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). Our complete data sets and our Supplemental 
Materials (including measures, stimuli, and further analyses that we did not have space to 
include in the paper) for all five studies—as well as the AsPredicted preregistration forms for 
Studies 2 through 5—can be found at the following OSF page: https://osf.io/d53um/. 
2.1.  Study 1 
2.1.1.  Participants and Experimental Design 
This study was approved by the College of Charleston Institutional Review Board. Based on 
Vohs and Schooler’s original sample size for Study 2 (which employed the Velten paradigm 
used here for Study 1) of N = 122 (roughly n = 25 per condition, given that they had 5 
conditions) and based on the effect size of their Anti-FW manipulation (d = 1.46), we aimed 
for 225 participants—a target that, given our plan to have only 2 conditions, was in keeping 
 
7 While Vohs and Schooler (2008) used FAD, the unpublished version of FAD+, we opted to use the latter since 






with standard protocols that suggest having at least three times the original sample size for a 
replication study (and which gave us roughly 80% power to detect an effect of d = .39 or 
greater). Participants were recruited via the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service and 
paid $1 for completing the survey. Participants were limited to those in the United States, 
who had a 98% successful completion rate (or higher) on MTurk and had successfully 
completed 500 tasks on MTurk. 221 participants completed the study. From our initial 
sample, 22 were excluded for failing an attention check8 and 37 for reporting having 
potentially completed a similar study in the past (or failing to report whether or not this was 
the case).9 This left us with a sample of N = 162 (58% male, 41% female, 1% other or 
unspecified; age: M = 33.97, SD = 10.56).  
Our goal was to test one of the key conceptual and explanatory claims made by Vohs 
and Schooler. On their view, prompts that challenge participants’ free will beliefs temporarily 
influence these beliefs (as measured by FAD scores). It is this temporary influence on belief—
coupled with an inference on the part of participants that the justification of moral beliefs 
and behaviors is in some way dependent on free will or with a sense that free will is required 
to make a difference to how we act—that Vohs and Schooler use to explain the cheating 
scores. After all, if the prompts did not influence beliefs in a detectable way, how could one 
 
8 The attention check was randomly presented when participants were completing FAD+—which is a long stretch 
of similar sounding items which might induce inattention. The item we used was: “For this item, you must select 
"disagree." If you don't select "disagree," you will not get credit for completing this HIT.” We also told 
participants before they read the primes that they would have to write a brief note about the content of the 
prime and state how difficult they found it to comprehend. We did not exclude participants based on how they 
responded to these items—but we included them, following Vohs and Schooler (2008), to increase the likelihood 
that participants paid attention. We used these same three methods for improving attention across all four 
studies. 
9 Previous research has shown non-naivete to undermine the effectiveness of certain experimental 
manipulations (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014; Rand, 2018). Moreover, previous research found that 30% 
of participants report prior experience taking part in research related to free will beliefs (Crone & Levy, 2018). 
So, to be on the safe side, for all four of our studies, we excluded participants who reported that they had taken 






know whether it is these altered beliefs that are driving the behavioral results? Given this, the 
first thing we wanted to do was to simply focus on whether we could manipulate participants’ 
scores on FAD+ with one of the prompts used by Vohs and Schooler.  
Participants first completed a Velten-style free will belief manipulation (Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008) modelled on the original Velten mood induction procedure (Velten, 1968). In 
this task, participants were required to read and carefully think about 15 statements (with 
each statement presented for 30 seconds).10 Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions (Control vs. Anti-FW), with the content of the statements varying across 
conditions. In the Anti-FW condition (n = 79), the statements were intended to undermine 
participants’ belief in free will (e.g., “Science has demonstrated that free will is an illusion”), 
whereas in the Control condition (n = 83), the statements were simple factual statements 
with no relation to free will (e.g., “Oceans cover 71% of the earth's surface”). 
For our primary measure of free will beliefs we used FAD+ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). 
As noted, FAD+ is a 27-item self-report measure of belief in free will in which participants rate 
the extent to which they agree with each statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 
5 (Strongly agree) with the statements forming four subscales: Free Will (e.g., “People have 
complete free will”;  = .85), Scientific Determinism (e.g., “Your genes determine your 
future”;  = .80), Fatalistic Determinism (e.g., “I believe that the future has already been 
determined by fate”;  = .86), Unpredictability (e.g., “People’s futures cannot be predicted”; 
 = .79). 
 
10 In Vohs and Schooler (2008) participants were presented with each statement for 1 minute. Since Vohs and 
Schooler did not offer an a priori justification for using the 1 minute threshold, for this study we limited exposure 





Participants also completed the 16-item BMIS (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) to measure 
current mood.11 The BMIS was administered with a prompt probing the extent to which 
participants felt 16 different emotions “right now.” Scores for the positive-tired ( = .88) and 
negative-relaxed ( = .87) subscales were computed as outlined by Mayer and Gaschke.  
Following Vohs and Schooler (2008), our prediction was that condition would 
differentially impact FAD+ scores, with scores in the Anti-FW condition being lower than 
scores in the Control condition. We assumed that if this prediction was not borne out, then 
this would cast some preliminary doubt on one of the key elements of the earlier findings by 
Vohs and Schooler (since they found a difference along this very dimension). 
2.1.2.  Results 
2.1.3.  Effect of manipulation on free will and related beliefs 
For our primary analyses, we used the conventional alpha criterion of .05 for significance 
testing (as used by Vohs and Schooler, 2008). We performed an independent samples Welch 
t-test comparing free will belief using the free will subscale of  FAD+ across conditions, failing 
to find evidence of an effect on free will beliefs (t(156.43) = 1.44, p = .153, d = -0.23). To the 
extent that there was any trend in the data, it was in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesized effect: participants in the Anti-FW condition (M = 3.82, 95% CI [3.66, 3.98], SD 
= 0.74) reported stronger Free will beliefs than participants in the Control condition (M = 3.66 
[3.52, 3.80], SD = 0.67). 
Turning to the other subscales of FAD+, we found that the Anti-FW manipulation 
elicited a significant increase in Scientific Determinism (Control M = 2.77 [2.63, 2.91], SD = 
 
11 Vohs and Schooler used PANAS as a measure of mood. We weren’t confident that PANAS is a good measure 
for this task given that PANAS asks about mood over the past two weeks. So, we chose to use BMIS for Study 





0.63; Anti-FW M = 3.14 [3.00, 3.28], SD = 0.72; t(154.45) = 3.45, p = .001, d = -0.54), but no 
statistically significant effects on Fatalistic Determinism (Control M = 2.26 [2.08, 2.44], SD = 
0.82; Anti-FW M = 2.47 [2.28, 2.66], SD = 0.86; t(158.4) = 1.63, p = .105, d = -0.26) or 
Unpredictability (Control M = 3.23 [3.09, 3.37], SD = 0.63; Anti-FW M = 3.22 [3.05, 3.39], SD = 
0.77; t(151.58) = 0.04, p = .969, d = 0.01). 
2.1.4. Effect of manipulation on mood 
The original study by Vohs and Schooler (2008) raised the possibility that the effect of their 
manipulation could be mediated by mood (i.e., participants in the Anti-FW condition cheated 
more because they experienced heightened negative affect and/or diminished positive 
affect). In the online Supplementary Materials, we present analyses exploring the possibility 
that the effect of the manipulation on Free will beliefs was mediated by positive or negative 
affect, finding no support for either mediation effect.  
2.1.5.   Discussion 
In short, our attempt in Study 1 to decrease free will beliefs with the Velten statements used 
by Vohs and Schooler (2008) was unsuccessful. Indeed, if anything, we found that scores on 
the Free Will subscale of FAD+ were slightly higher in the Anti-FW condition than in the 
Control condition. More puzzling still, scores on the Scientific Determinism subscale of FAD+ 
were also higher—which should have corresponded with lower scores on the Free Will 
subscale given the explanation Vohs and Schooler provided for their findings. Given this, we 
decided to make three changes and run a follow up study. First, we would roughly double our 
sample size to substantially increase power. Second, we would try the Crick paradigm rather 
than the Velten paradigm. Finally, we would add a behavioral task to allow for and measure 
cheating behavior. 





2.2.1. Participants and Experimental Design 
For this preregistered study—which was approved by the College of Charleston Institutional 
Review Board—participants were recruited via MTurk. Participants were limited to those in 
the United States, who had at least a 98% success rate and had successfully completed at 
least 500 previous tasks on Mturk. Study 2 of Vohs and Schooler (2008) had N = 119 
participants divided among 5 conditions. To prioritize avoidance of a Type II over a Type I 
error, since this is a replication attempt, we decided to dramatically increase our power 
relative to the original studies by Vohs and Schooler: We ran two conditions, and planned to 
recruit 175 participants per cell, or 350 participants overall. A sample of 350 would give us > 
.999 power (two-tailed) to detect an effect of the size detected by Vohs and Schooler in their 
study (d = .84).  
We successfully recruited 342 participants for the study. Each participant was paid $3 
for completing the study. Ten participants received a $10 bonus (see below for details). Of 
the participants who began the study, 20 did not complete the study, 3 failed the attention 
check, and 36 reported that they had previously taken or might have previously taken a 
similar study. We excluded these participants from all analysis, resulting in a final sample of 
N = 283 (53% male, 47% female, <%1 other or unspecified; age: M = 36.7, SD = 11.60 ; Anti-
FW condition, n = 144, Control condition, n = 139). Based on the sample size for all participants 
whose data were included in the analysis, the resulting power to detect an effect the size 
detected by Vohs and Schooler in their study remained > .999. Given the resulting sample 
size, we had 80% power to detect an effect size of d = .34.  
The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate a study from Vohs and Schooler (2008) which 
focused on the influence (or lack thereof) of Anti-FW prompts on people’s beliefs, moods, 





participated in their respective labs. While our replication study was conducted on-line and is 
thus not an exact replication, we tried our best to ensure that our study methodologically 
reflected their earlier work as much as possible despite some inescapable differences (see 
Earp, in press for theoretical support).  
Participants in Study 2 were first presented with a consent form where they were 
informed that they would be participating in two completely independent studies—a salient 
feature of Vohs and Schooler’s earlier studies that was not reported. Based on private 
conversations with Vohs and Schooler, it appears that splitting the study in this way made a 
difference to the results. This is a standard form of harmless deception in the experimental 
literature. We adopted the same strategy for Studies 2 and 3. 
In Study 2, participants were told that, as part of their first study, they would be 
presented with a passage to read. They were also told that they would be expected to briefly 
summarize the passage and say how difficult it was to understand. Participants were then 
told that we would have them provide some information about their concepts, beliefs, and 
mood. This is the same approach used by Vohs and Schooler (including the same materials).  
At this point, participants were told that in their second study, they would be 
completing an intelligence test that contains three sections and fifteen items: 5 logical 
reasoning puzzles, 5 verbal synonym questions, and 5 verbal sentence completion tasks. This 
technique—namely, telling participants that their performance on a task will be reflective of 
some positive personal trait such as IQ, intelligence, or life success—has been used 
successfully in previous cheating paradigms (see, e.g., Deinstbier et al., 1980).  
We also told participants that the 15-item test was designed to take no more than 15 
minutes—so, they should try not to spend more than 1 minute on any given item. We 





Participants were told that the 10 participants who received the highest scores would receive 
a $10 bonus. They were also told that in the event that more than ten participants got the 
highest possible score—i.e., 15 out of 15—we would select 10 people randomly from this pool 
to determine which participants got the reward. 
For the first part of the study, participants read one of two different excerpts by 
Francis Crick: In the Anti-FW condition, the excerpt was a passage about free will. In the 
control condition, the excerpt was a passage about consciousness that did not mention free 
will. These are the same two prompts used by Vohs and Schooler (2008)—including a picture 
of Crick, a brief description of who he is, and the excerpt from his book The Astonishing 
Hypothesis. After reading their prompt, participants were asked to briefly summarize the 
Crick piece and state how difficult they found it to comprehend. These two steps were also 
part of the original Vohs and Schooler studies.  
After participants read the excerpt, they filled out FAD+ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). 
Reliabilities were again adequate for all four subscales (Free Will: α = .75; Scientific 
Determinism: α = .68; Fatalistic Determinism: α = .86; Unpredictability: α = .72). In their 
original studies, Vohs and Schooler next had participants fill out PANAS in an effort to make 
sure that their behavioral findings were produced by the specific content of the Crick 
prompts, rather that whatever emotions the Crick prompt may have induced in the 
participants. However, for the reasons we mentioned in Study 1 (namely, for this type of 
study, we are interested in whatever impact the manipulation has on participants’ mood at 
the time not on participants’ reported mood from the past two weeks), we once again used 
BMIS as a measure of current mood instead. Scores for the positive-tired ( = .74) and 






Participants were then informed that they had completed the first study and that they 
would now take part in the second study. This is where we introduced participants to the 
aforementioned cheating paradigm involving the intelligence test. For our replication, we 
decided to adopt a similar active cheating paradigm (similar to Study 2 of Vohs & Schooler, 
2008), because this rules out that the cheating is simply due to de-motivating effects of the 
Anti-FW prompt. Vohs and Schooler had participants work on 15 word, mathematical, logical, 
and reasoning items, taken from the GRE (which we confirmed via personal correspondence). 
While we do not know which 15 items Vohs and Schooler used—as they do not recollect 
(based on personal correspondence)—we adopted a similar paradigm which involves 15 
items taken from the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) and the GRE. 
Participants in both conditions were told to do their work with pencil and paper (so 
we could not possibly see how well they performed). We then showed them the correct 
answers and gave them the chance to self-report how many items they answered correctly 
(which gave them an opportunity to overreport). Because they did their work with pencil and 
paper, they knew we had no way of knowing whether they were cheating or overreporting. 
Of course, this means that we did not, in fact, have any way to know whether any particular 
individual overreported. Instead, the collective answers for each condition shed light on 
whether people in a given condition were more likely to overreport than people in different 
conditions. This was a feature of the active cheating paradigm used by Vohs and Schooler 
(2008). Based on the findings reported by Vohs and Schooler (2008), our prediction was that 
participants in the Anti-FW condition would cheat more—that is, have higher self-reported 






First, independent samples t-test were conducted to test whether there was a difference 
between the conditions on FAD+ or BMIS. There was no evidence of an effect of condition on 
any of the FAD+ subscales (uncorrected ps >.228), or on mood (uncorrected ps >.05). See 
Table 1 for a summary. Second, to test whether cheating behavior differed between Anti-FW 
and Control conditions, we ran an independent samples Welch t-test. With a power of .80 to 
detect an effect of d = .34 and a power > .999 to detect an effect of the size Vohs and Schooler 
detected in their original study (d = .84), we failed to find any evidence of a difference in 
cheating behavior between the Anti-FW (M = 9.52 SD = 3.60, 95% CI [8.93, 10.11]) and Control 
conditions (M = 10.34, SD = 3.73, 95% CI [9.72, 10.96]), t(319.3) = -1.873, p = .062, d = .18. To 
the extent there was a trend in the data, it was in the opposite direction of what was reported 
in Vohs and Schooler (2008). See Figure 1.  
Table 1. 
Independent Samples t-Test comparing Anti-FW and Control conditions on FAD+ Subscales 
    
95% CI for Mean 
Difference 
   t df p 
Mean 
Difference 
SE Difference Cohen's d Lower 
Free Will  -0.057 280.9 0.955 -0.005 0.085 -0.01 -0.172 
Scientific 
Determinism  
0.114 280.9 0.909 0.009 0.077 0.01 -0.143 
Fatalistic 
Determinism  
-1.044 266 0.297 -0.112 0.108 -0.13 -0.324 
Randomness  -0.848 278.5 0.397 -0.069 0.082 -0.10 -0.23 
  















Contrary to our prediction and contrary to the original findings reported by Vohs and Schooler 
(2008), the Crick paradigm did not influence scores on free will beliefs and did not influence 
cheating behavior (if anything, the data trended in the opposite direction). As such, we failed 
to replicate these findings. We had one hypothesis for why we might have come up empty 
handed. Namely, responding to FAD+ immediately after reading the prompt might diminish 
the potential impact of the prompt by the time participants begin the cheating task. To test 
this hypothesis, we made a few basic changes to the paradigm and reran Study 2 with the 
goal of trying once again to replicate the earlier behavioral findings from Vohs and Schooler. 





2.3.1 Participants and Experimental Design 
For this preregistered study—which was approved by the College of Charleston Institutional 
Review Board—participants were recruited via MTurk. Participants were limited to those in 
the United States, who had at least a 98% success rate and had successfully completed at 
least 500 previous tasks on Mturk. For Study 2 of Vohs and Schooler (2008), they had 119 
participants split across 5 conditions (roughly 20 participants per cell). For Study 3, we once 
again ran two conditions, and planned to recruit 150 participants per cell, or 300 participants 
overall. This would have given us > .999 power (two-tailed) to detect an effect of the size 
detected by Vohs and Schooler in their study (d = .84).  
We successfully recruited 302 participants for the study. Each participant was paid $3 
for completing the study. Ten participants received a $10 bonus. Of the participants who 
began the study, 3 did not complete the study, 4 failed the attention check, and 27 reported 
that they had previously taken or might have previously taken a similar study. We excluded 
these participants from all analyses, resulting in a sample of N = 268 (58% male, 41% female, 
<%1 other or unspecified; age: M = 38.2, SD = 12.66; Anti-FW condition, n = 142, Control 
condition, n = 126). Based on the sample size for all participants whose data were included in 
the analysis, the resulting power to detect an effect of the size detected by Vohs and Schooler 
remained > .999. Given the resulting sample size, we had 80% power to detect an effect size 
of d = .35. Each was paid $3 for completing the study. Ten participants received a $10 bonus 
(see below for details). Participants took on average 32 minutes and 38 seconds to complete 
the study.  
For our second behavioral study, we wanted to give the original findings a fair day in 
court. As noted, we thought that one possible explanation for why we failed to replicate the 





prompts and participating in the cheating paradigm might dampen the influence of the 
prompts on cheating behavior. For this study, we once again had two conditions. The prompts 
were the same two Crick prompts from Study 2. However, Study 3 reversed the order of key 
parts of Study 2 and added one additional measure of moral belief. The order of presentation 
was as follows: 
1. Prompt (Anti-FW vs. Control) 
2. Participants answered two multiple choice questions, and then, just as in Study 2, they 
wrote a brief summary of the passage and described how hard they found it to 
comprehend. 
3. Participants completed the cheating paradigm (precisely as before). 
4. Participants responded to a six-item Business Ethics measure (Cooper & Pullig, 
2013).12 
5. Participants responded to FAD+.13  
6. Participants responded to BMIS.14 
7. Participants provided demographics. 
8. Participants were debriefed, just as before. 
 
2.3.2. Results 
First, independent samples t-test were conducted to test whether there was a difference 
between the conditions on FAD+ or BMIS. There was no evidence of an effect of condition on 
any of the FAD+ subscales (uncorrected ps >.157), or on mood (uncorrected ps >.065). See 
Table 2 for a summary. Second, to test whether cheating behavior differed between Anti-FW 
condition and Control condition, we performed an independent samples Welch t-test. With a 
power of .80 to detect a an effect of d = .35, and power > .999 to detect an effect of the size 
detected by Vohs and Schooler in their original study (d = .84), we failed to find any evidence 
of a difference in cheating behavior between the Anti-FW condition (M = 9.78, SD = 3.32, 95% 
 
12 We included this so we had an indirect measure of immoral behavior. 
13 Reliabilities were again adequate for all four subscales of FAD+ (Free Will:  = .68; Scientific Determinism:  = 
.66; Fatalistic Determinism:  = .85; Unpredictability:  = .71). 





CI [9.23, 10.33]) and the Control condition (M = 10.08, SD = 3.10, 95% CI [9.54, 10.62]), t(265.3) 
= -0.777, p = .438, d = -.10. To the extent there was a trend in the data, it was, again, in the 
opposite direction of what was found in Vohs and Schooler (2008). See Figure 2. Additionally, 
there was no evidence of an effect of condition on any of the six items from the Business 
Ethics questionnaire, ps > .230. See Table 3 for a summary. 
Table 2. 
Independent Samples t-Test comparing Anti-FW and Control Conditions on FAD+ Subscales 
    
95% CI for Mean 
Difference 
   t df p 
Mean 
Difference 
SE Difference Cohen's d Lower 
Free Will  -1.418 266 0.157 -0.12 0.085 -0.17 -0.287 
Scientific 
Determinism  
0.249 266 0.804 0.019 0.078 0.03 -0.134 
Fatalistic 
Determinism  
0.800 265.7 0.424 0.086 0.107 0.10 -0.125 
Randomness  0.703 261.8 0.482 0.062 0.087 0.09 -0.111 
  















Table 3.  
 
Independent Samples t-Test Comparing Anti-FW and Control Conditions on Business Ethics Items 
    
95% CI for Mean 
Difference 
   t df p 
Mean 
Difference 
SE Difference Cohen's d Lower 
Paid expense 
account 
-0.0458 254.9 0.647 -0.056 0.121 -0.01 -0.294 
Quid pro quo -0.652 262.5 0.515 -0.137 0.210 -0.08 -0.549 
Nepotism 0.087 262.5 0.931 0.017 0.192 0.01 -0.362 
Misleading 
marketing 
1.204 265.8 0.230 0.212 0.176 0.15 -0.0135 
Violate company 
policy 
0.794 262.3 0.428 0.12 0.151 0.10 -0.177 
Environmental harm -0.296 261.8 -0.064 -0.064 0.217 -0.04 -0.491 
  









Despite our best efforts, we once again failed to replicate the earlier findings by Vohs and 
Schooler (2008). First, the Crick prime did not influence free will beliefs. Second, participants 
in the Anti-FW condition were no more likely to cheat than participants in the Control 
condition. Finally, scores on a measure of moral beliefs were no different between the two 
conditions. Given that previous research suggests that it can be difficult to replicate these 
findings, we take our findings to cast further doubt on the claim that challenging free will 
beliefs in the way done by Vohs and Schooler (2008) increases cheating behavior (as they 
operationalized this) in a reliable manner.  
However, before throwing in the towel in our efforts to replicate the findings from 
Vohs and Schooler (2008), we thought we would run another study that might correct for 
some potential explanations for why we failed to successfully manipulate free will beliefs in 
our first three studies. For instance, one reason the prime we used in Study 1 may not have 
influenced free will beliefs is that we only exposed participants to the Velten statements for 
30 seconds rather than 1 minute, which was the approach used by Vohs and Schooler (2008). 
Another possible explanation is that while our studies were very highly powered relative to 
the original studies by Vohs and Schooler, they might still have been underpowered to detect 
an effect that is smaller than what was detected by Vohs and Schooler (2008), but still 
potentially of scientific interest. So, we decided to run a preregistered follow-up study that 
addressed these two concerns. Also, rather than departing from Vohs and Schooler in using 
BMIS to measure mood as we did in Study 1, for Study 4 we decided to use a modified version 
of PANAS that indexed responses to present and not past emotions and mood. 





2.4.1. Participants and Experimental Design 
For this preregistered study—which was approved by the College of Charleston Institutional 
Review Board—a power analysis using G*Power suggested that with two experimental 
conditions, we would need a minimum of 858 participants to detect a small effect of d = .20, 
given an alpha of .05 and power of .90 for a one-tailed significance test. Note that we decided 
to use a one-tailed, rather than two-tailed, significance test so as to maximize the chance of 
a successful replication. We decided in advance that d = .20 would be the smallest effect size 
of interest (even though the effect size in Vohs and Schooler was much larger).15 We recruited 
967 participants via MTurk (compared to N = 30 in the original Vohs and Schooler study using 
the Velten paradigm, that is, a more than 30 times greater sample size).  
Participants were paid $1 for completing the survey and were limited to those in the 
United States who had at least a 98% successful completion rate on MTurk and had 
successfully completed 500 tasks. As outlined in the pre-registration, of these participants, 35 
were excluded for failing an attention check,  123 for reporting having potentially completed 
a similar study in the past, and  5 for having missing data on one or more of the key outcome 
measures (the four FAD+ subscales or the FW slider) or PANAS. This left us with a final sample 
of N = 804 for our primary analyses (53% male, 46% female, 1% other or unspecified; age: M 
= 38.88, SD = 12.07).  
Since we did not have any success manipulating free will beliefs in Studies 2 and 3 
using the Crick paradigm despite having what we took to be adequate power, we thought it 
made sense to try a higher-powered study using the 15-item Velten paradigm for Study 4. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: the Control condition (n = 375) 
 






or the Anti-FW condition (n = 429). The manipulation was identical to Study 1 with the 
exception that each statement was displayed for 60 seconds rather than 30, following the 
original methods of Vohs and Schooler (2008). 
As in Study 1, we measured free will beliefs using FAD+ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). 
Reliabilities were again adequate for all four subscales (Free Will  = .85; Scientific 
Determinism  = .78; Fatalistic Determinism  = .85; Unpredictability  = .81). 
As an additional measure of free will beliefs, we included a single-item slider in which 
participants rated their agreement with the statement “I have free will” on a slider with values 
ranging from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 100 (Strongly agree). 
Participants also completed a modified version of PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) to measure current mood. The PANAS was administered with a modified prompt geared 
towards enabling us to explore the extent to which participants felt 20 different emotions 
right now. These 20 items were then used to create measures of positive affect (PA;  = .92), 
and negative affect (NA;  = .91). 
2.4.2. Results 
2.4.2.1. Effect of manipulation on free will belief 
As outlined in the pre-registration, we performed one-tailed significance tests for the effects 
of the manipulation on free will beliefs as measured by the slider and the free will subscale of 
FAD+. The manipulation produced statistically significant decreases in both: slider  = -0.41, 
95% CI [-0.56, -0.28], one-tailed p < .001; FAD+  = -0.14 [-0.28, -0.00], one-tailed p = .045. 





conventional t-tests, accompanied by effect size estimates expressed as Cohen’s d.16 Notably 
the effect sizes are close to zero, and thus far smaller than what we had pre-designated as 
the “smallest effect size of interest.”  
2.4.2.2. Effect of manipulation on related beliefs 
We also performed a set of parallel analyses on the effect of the manipulation on the three 
other subscales of FAD+ (with these significance tests being two-tailed). We found no effect 
of the manipulation on Fatalistic Determinism ( = 0.03 [-0.10, 0.17], p = .642) or 
Unpredictability ( = 0.05 [-0.09, 0.19], p = .474); however, we did observe a statistically 
significant, but very small in terms of effect size, increase in the endorsement of Scientific 
Determinism ( = 0.15 [0.02,  0.29], p = .028).17 
2.4.2.3. Exploratory test for potential mediation by mood 
As in Study 1, we tested separate mediation models for each of the four combinations of free 
will beliefs (FAD+ and slider) and mood (PA and NA) measures, finding neither direct effects 
of condition on mood, nor indirect effects of condition on free will beliefs via mood. These 
models are summarized in the online Supplementary Materials.  
2.4.3. Discussion 
 
16 Because our analysis plan resulted in regressing our outcome measures on a single binary variable, we note 
here that it would have been more conventional to perform t-tests, so we report these here (with the results 
being identical aside from the slightly different degrees of freedom calculation in the Welch t-test). For the FAD+ 
measure of free will belief, participants in the Anti-FW condition (M = 3.69, SD = 0.70) scored slightly but 
significantly lower than those in the Control condition (M = 3.78, SD = 0.70), t(913.89) = 1.99, p = .023 (one-
tailed), d = -0.13. Similarly, for the slider measure, participants in the Anti-FW condition (M = 72.93, SD = 25.93) 
scored significantly lower than those in the Control condition (M = 82.91, SD = 20.78), t(913.98) = 6.49, p < .001 
(one-tailed), d = -0.43. 
17 Again, for completeness, the results of Welch t-tests addressing the same questions were as follows. For 
Scientific Determinism, participants in the Control condition (M = 2.98, SD = 0.64) scored significantly lower than 
those in the Anti-FW condition (M = 3.08, SD = 0.69), t(923.97) = 2.33, p = .020, d = 0.15. For Fatalistic Determinism, 
there were no significant differences between conditions (Control M = 2.47, SD = 0.86; Anti-FW M = 2.53, SD = 
0.84; t(909.9) = 1.05, p = .293, d = 0.07). Similarly for Unpredictability, there were no significant differences 






Our goal with Study 4 was to once again try to replicate the impact of primes used by Vohs 
and Schooler (2008) on free will beliefs. Given the two main modifications we made compared 
to Study 1—changing exposure from 30 seconds to 1 minute and making sure our study was 
very highly powered—we were able, with a generous one-tailed t-test, to decrease free will 
beliefs (as measured by the Free Will subscale of FAD+ and a new Free Will slider) using the 
Velten paradigm that was used in one of the original studies by Vohs and Schooler. Moreover, 
mood did not seem to explain these results. However, the Cohen’s effect size estimate for the 
decreases in FAD+ scores, while significant, was only d = -0.13, which is far smaller than the 
pre-designated “smallest effect size of interest” (d = .20) and incomparably smaller than the 
original effect size detected by Vohs and Schooler (d = .84).  Thus, we are not sure what to 
make of the findings from Study 4. While we were finally able to detect at least some 
movement in free will beliefs as a result of administering an Anti-FW prompt used by Vohs 
and Schooler (2008), our “sledgehammer” approach (very large sample size, one-tailed t-test, 
and so on) yielded effects so small in size it is hard to know what their practical or theoretical 
importance could be. To put this another way, if Vohs and Schooler (2008) were able to 
manipulate both free will beliefs and moral behavior with roughly 20 participants per cell—
using many of the very same materials we used in our studies—it is surprising that we should 
need 400+ participants per cell to find any measurable effect of the manipulation.  
All told, it seems much more difficult to manipulate free will beliefs than a number of 
researchers have suggested in the wake of Vohs and Schooler’s original findings. However, as 
we were technically able to manipulate such beliefs (by some amount) using the Velten 
paradigm with a very large sample, we wanted to run a similarly high-powered follow-up 
study that added back in the cheating paradigm we used in Studies 2 and 3. After all, the best 





cheating behavior requires that we first successfully manipulate free will beliefs (which we 
were unable to do in Studies 1 through 3). In other words, we wanted to close the loop 
between manipulated free will beliefs and behavior, now that we had found a way to 
measurably achieve the manipulation, however weak.  
2.5. Study 5 
2.5.1. Participants and Experimental Design 
For this preregistered study—which was approved by the College of Charleston Institutional 
Review Board—a power analysis using G*Power suggested that with two experimental 
conditions, we would need a minimum of 858 participants to detect a small effect of d = .20, 
given an alpha of .05 and power of .90 for a one-tailed significance test. We recruited 1040 
participants via MTurk. Participants were limited to those in the United States, who had at 
least a 98% success rate and had successfully completed at least 500 previous tasks on Mturk. 
Of the 1040 participants recruited,  32 did not complete the study, 7 failed at least one 
of the attention checks, and 19 reported they had previously taken a similar study. We 
excluded these participants from all analyses, resulting in a sample of N = 982 (52% male, 48% 
female, <%1 other or unspecified; age: M = 40.9, SD = 12.82; Anti-FW condition, n = 491 , 
Control condition, n = 491). Each was paid $3 for completing the study. Ten participants 
received a $10 bonus (see below for details). Participants took on average 39 minutes and 27 
seconds to complete the study.  
In our previous two behavioral studies we did not find any effect of prime (Anti-FW 
vs. Control) on cheating behavior or on free will beliefs. However, in Study 4, we were able to 
achieve a very small effect of prime on free will beliefs. The main difference between Study 4 
and the previous behavioral studies was that Study 4 used the Velten sentences instead of 





the sample size to be comparable to, and even larger than, Study 4; we used the Velten 
sentences as the prime (Anti-FW vs. Control); and we included the same cheating paradigm 
we used in Studies 2 and 3. We also once again used the Free Will slider (as in Study 4) as an 
additional measure of free will beliefs. The order of presentation was as follows: 
1. Velten sentences (Anti-FW vs. Control) 
2. Participants responded to FAD+18 
3. Participants responded to the free will slider 
4. Participants completed the cheating paradigm (precisely as before). 
5. Participants provided demographics 
6. Participants were debriefed 
 
2.5.2. Results 
First, independent samples Welch’s t-tests were conducted to test whether there was 
a difference between the conditions on FAD+ subscales and the Free Will slider. Using 
unadjusted p-values and a one-tailed test, there was a detectable effect of condition on the 
FAD+ Free Will subscale, t(979.73) = -2.368, p = .018, d = -.15, and the Free Will slider, t(971.51) = -
4.482, p < .001, d = -.29, such that those in the Anti-FW condition reported lower beliefs in 
free will than those in the Control condition. We also found an effect of condition on the FAD+ 
Scientific Determinism subscale, t(970.59) = 2.737, p = .006, d = .18, such that those in the Anti-
FW condition reported higher beliefs in scientific determinism than those in the Control 
condition. There was no evidence of an effect on the remaining FAD+ subscales, ps > .246. 
See Table 4 for a summary. 
Second, to test whether cheating behavior differed between the Anti-FW condition 
and Control condition, we performed an independent samples Welch’s t-test. Even using a 
 
18  Reliabilities were again adequate for all four subscales of FAD+ (Free Will:  = .84, Scientific Determinism:  






one-tailed test, we failed to find evidence of a difference in cheating behavior between the 
Anti-FW condition (M = 9.88, SD = 3.27, 95% CI [9.59 , 10.2]) and the Control condition (M = 
10.11, SD = 3.38, 95% CI [9.81, 10.40]), t(265.3) = 1.066, p = .287, d = .13. In fact, in absolute 
terms, the mean cheating score was lower in the Control condition than in the Anti-FW 
condition, contrary to predictions. See Figure 3.  
Table 4. 
Independent Samples t-Test comparing Anti-FW and Control Conditions on FAD+ Subscales 
    
95% CI for Mean 
Difference 
   t df p 
Mean 
Difference 
SE Difference Cohen's d Lower 
FAD+ Free Will  -2.368 979.7 0.018 -0.766 0.323 -0.15 -1.400 
FAD+ Scientific 
Determinism  
2.737 970.6 0.006 0.831 0.304 0.18 0.173 
FAD+ Fatalistic 
Determinism  
1.160 980.0 0.246 0.324 0.279 0.07 -0.224 
FAD+ Randomness  -0.968 980.0 0.333 -0.244 0.253 -0.06 -0.740 
Free Will Slider -4.482 971.5 < .001 -7.289 1.626 -0.29 -10.48 
  





















For Study 5, our primary goal was to extend what we did in Study 4 by adding a behavioral 
measure. We thought that if we could once again successfully manipulate free will beliefs, 
however weakly, using another very large sample, we would be well-placed to better test the 
purported relationship between these beliefs and cheating behavior. As we saw it, there were 
three ways the findings could turn out. First, we might successfully manipulate both free will 
beliefs and cheating behavior (which would support the original findings by Vohs and 
Schooler). Second, we could fail to successfully manipulate either free will beliefs or cheating 
behavior (which would not, by itself, undermine the relationship between the two). Finally, 
we could successfully manipulate free will beliefs but nevertheless fail to manipulate cheating 
behavior (which would call the purported link between the two into question).  
The results from Study 5 provide compelling evidence for the third option—that is, while 
we were able to measurably weaken participants’ beliefs in free will, this did not make them 





regarding the purported relationship between free will beliefs and cheating behavior using a 
very small sample, we failed to find any evidence of this relationship using a very large sample. 
Moreover, while we were able to manipulate free will beliefs as measured by FAD+, the 
Cohen’s effect size estimate for the decreases in FAD+ scores, while significant, was only d = 
-0.15, which is once again far smaller than the pre-designated “smallest effect size of interest” 
(d = .20) and much smaller than the original effect size detected by Vohs and Schooler (d = 
.84). 
We think this is bad news for their original findings. On the one hand, we failed to 
manipulate free will beliefs in three studies using much larger samples sizes than the original 
studies by Vohs and Schooler (Studies 1–3). On the other hand, while we were able to weakly 
manipulate free will beliefs in two very high-powered studies (Studies 4 and 5), this did not 
influence how likely participants were to cheat (Study 5). So, not only is manipulating free will 
beliefs much more difficult than Vohs and Schooler originally suggested, but even when one 
succeeds in this regard, using a “sledgehammer” approach to maximize the chance of success, 
it does not appear to have any impact on cheating behavior. 
3. Pooled Data Analysis 
To provide a more precise estimate of the effects of the two manipulations used across the 
five studies, we conducted a set of exploratory regression analyses using data pooled across 
Studies 1, 4, and 5 (using the Velten task) and across Studies 2 and 3 (using the Crick 
manipulation). For the first set of analyses, given that Studies 1 and 4 only attempted to 
manipulate free will beliefs (with no accompanying measure of ethical behavior), we assessed 
the effects of the Velten manipulation on all four subscales of the FAD+.19 All four analyses 
 





entailed regressing the outcome variable (FAD+ subscale) on dummy variables representing 
condition (Control vs. Anti-FW) and study number. Results of these regressions are presented 
in Table 5. 
Contrasting with the analyses of Studies 1 and 4, and consistent with Study 5, we 
observed a small, significantly negative effect of the Velten manipulation on the Free Will 
subscale, with the coefficient suggesting that the manipulation decreased free will beliefs by 
around one tenth of a standard deviation, or just one twelfth of a scale point (on a five point 
scale). Interestingly, however, the manipulation also induced a significant increase in scores 
on the Scientific Determinism subscale (also small, but close to twice the magnitude of the 
effect of the manipulation on free will beliefs). Additionally, the manipulation produced a 
non-significant increase in Fatalistic Determinism, with an effect size of similar magnitude to 
the effect of the manipulation on free will beliefs. There was no effect of the manipulation on 
scores on the Unpredictability subscale.20 An additional regression model pooling data from 
Studies 2 and 5 to estimate the effect of the manipulation on the Free Will slider measure 
revealed a statistically significant but negative effect of the manipulation on free will beliefs 
( = -0.34 [-0.43 – -0.26], p < .001). See the Table in the Pooled Analysis folder on our OSF 
page for this project for additional details: https://osf.io/d53um/  
  
 
20 We also observed a significant effect of study number on scores on the Unpredictability subscale. Specifically, 







Pooled data analysis of effects of Velten manipulation on FAD+ subscales 
  Free Will Scientific Determinism Fatalistic Determinism Unpredictability 
Predictors B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p 
Intercept 0.11 
[-0.05 – 0.27] 
.190 -0.18 
[-0.33 – -0.02] 
.030 -0.17 
[-0.33 – -0.01] 
.034 -0.23 
[-0.39 – -0.07] 
.005 
Condition -0.11 
[-0.20 – 0.03] 
.010 0.19 
[0.11 – 0.28] 
<.001 0.09 
[-0.00 – 0.17] 
.051 -.02 
[-0.10 – 0.07] 
.705 
Study 4 -0.01 
[-0.17 – 0.16] 
.951 0.11 
[-0.05 – 0.28] 
.175 0.16 
[-0.01 – 0.33] 
.062 0.23 
[0.07 – 0.40] 
.006 
Study 5 -0.10 
[-0.26 – 0.07] 
.246 0.05 
[-0.11 – 0.22] 
.515 0.12 
[-0.04 – 0.29] 
.151 0.27 
[0.11 – 0.44] 
.001 
R2 / R2 adjusted .005 / .004 .011 / .009 .004 / .002 .005 / .004 
Note: All Ns = 2071; All coefficients are standardized; p values < .05 in boldface. 
 
For the second set of analyses using the Crick manipulation in Studies 2 and 3, we 
again assessed the effects of the Crick manipulation on all four subscales of FAD+, as well as 
on BMIS subscales and our behavioral measure of cheating. Analyses were structured 
identically to those described above for Studies 1 and 2, regressing the outcome variable on 
dummy variables for condition and study number. Results of these analyses are presented in 
Table 6. Again, consistent with the analyses of the two studies in isolation, we observed no 
effects of the Crick manipulation on any FAD+ of BMIS subscale (though we note that the 
coefficient for the effect of the manipulation on free will beliefs was similar in magnitude to 
that of the Velten manipulation reported in Table 5). We did, however, observe a non-
significant effect of the manipulation on our cheating measure in the opposite direction to 
that reported in the literature, such that participants in the Anti-FW condition reported 













Pooled data analysis of effects of Crick manipulation on FAD+ and BMIS subscales and cheating behavior. 
  Free Will Scientific Determinism Fatalistic Determinism Unpredictability Reported Items Correct Positive Tired Negative Relaxed 
Predictors B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p B [95% CI] p 
(Intercept) 0.03 
[-0.12 – 0.17] 
.693 0.05 
[-0.10 – 0.19] 
.507 0.08 
[-0.07 – 0.22] 
.308 -0.02 
[-0.16 – 0.13] 
.797 0.08 
[-0.06 – 0.23] 
.252 -0.04 
[-0.19 – 0.10] 
.577 0.06 
[-0.09 – 0.20] 
.437 
Condition -0.09 
[-0.25 – 0.08] 
.313 0.02 
[-0.15 – 0.19] 
.800 -0.02 
[-0.19 – 0.15] 
.832 -0.01 
[-0.18 – 0.16] 
.922 -0.16 
[-0.33 – 0.00] 
.054 0.03 
[-0.14 – 0.19] 
.769 -0.02 
[-0.18 – 0.15] 
.845 
Study 0.03 
[-0.14 – 0.20] 
.706 -0.12 
[-0.29 – 0.04] 
.148 -0.14 
[-0.30 – 0.03] 
.114 0.05 
[-0.12 – 0.22] 
.575 0.00 
[-0.17 – 0.17] 
.979 0.06 
[-0.11 – 0.23] 
.498 -0.10 
[-0.27 – 0.07] 
.241 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.002 / -0.002 0.004 / 0.000 0.005 / 0.001 0.001 / -0.003 0.007 / 0.003 0.001 / -0.003 0.003 / -0.001 














4. General Discussion 
The free will debate has gone mainstream in recent years in the wake of scientific advances 
that on some accounts seem to undermine free will. Given the traditional associations 
between free will and moral responsibility, a great deal may hang on this debate. In a high-
profile paper on the relationship between free will beliefs and moral behavior, Vohs and 
Schooler (2008) cautioned against public pronouncements disputing the existence of free will, 
based on their findings concerning the relationship between free will beliefs and cheating. 
Our goal in this paper was to replicate their landmark findings. Across five studies, we were 
unable to detect any effects consistent with their findings greater than d = |.17|when using 
FAD+ as belief in free will measure or greater than d = |.29| when using free will slider as 
belief in free will measure. Specifically, while we were able to measurably, but very weakly, 
influence people’s beliefs in free will in two of the five studies, we failed in our efforts to find 
any relationship between free will beliefs and cheating behavior. When coupled with the work 
of other researchers who have had difficulty replicating the original findings by Vohs and 
Schooler, we think this should give us further cause for concern.  
 There are a few other noteworthy findings that merit discussion before closing. First, 
our findings may suggest that the Velten statements are more effective in manipulating free 
will beliefs, however slightly, than the excerpt from Crick (even if neither seem to be effective 
in manipulating cheating behavior). It is possible that this is an artifact not of the respective 
manipulations, however, but of relative sample size (i.e., we had a much larger total sample 
size for the studies using Velten statements than the studies using the Crick excerpts). 
Nevertheless, there are at least two possible reasons why the Velten statements might be 




while the Crick passage argues for a more esoteric kind of epiphenomenalism that people 
may find more confusing (or less compelling). And second, the control condition in the Velten 
paradigm is more appropriate than the control condition for the Crick paradigm—which 
involves an excerpt about consciousness from Crick’s book, a topic that is closely related to 
the passage used in the experimental condition. The second thing worth mentioning is that 
our pooled analysis suggests that the Velten paradigm can (again, quite weakly) influence 
both free will beliefs and beliefs about scientific determinism (and sometimes fatalistic 
determinism). So, even when the Velten paradigm is effective in manipulating people’s beliefs 
about free will, it lacks specificity. As such, it might be more fruitful moving forward to design 
manipulations that target either free will or determinism.21 
 All of that said, there are three potential limitations to our studies. First, we ran our 
studies online rather than using a convenience sample, as Vohs and Schooler did. While we 
tried to ensure that we mimicked their original work as much as possible, follow up studies 
with a convenience sample would certainly be valuable in terms of exact replication. 
However, the differences in sampling method should not detract from the upshot of our 
replication attempts. After all, the original effect (and its societal implications) are claimed to 
be pervasive and of potential practical importance. If directly communicating skepticism 
about free will barely weakened people's free will beliefs and (going beyond our own data) at 
most resulted in only a trivial increase in bad behavior (or affected behavior in a very limited 
range of contexts), then the basic effect is arguably unimportant and unworthy of the 
substantial attention it has received so far. Moreover, in terms of ecological validity, most 
 
21 In light of our findings, we thought we might make the following suggestion for researchers interested in trying 
to manipulate free will beliefs: Given the estimated effect size of the two manipulations in the pooled data 
analysis was around one tenth of a SD (i.e., d = 0.10), this implies that a simple two condition study would require 
over 1,500 participants per condition to achieve 80% power for a significant two-tailed manipulation check using 




ordinary people who read about scientific findings that might bear on free will likely do so on 
their computers at home, as in our study, rather than in a psychology department laboratory 
context with limited demographic diversity.    
 A second limitation of our research is that we only used American participants. 
However, this limitation is an artifact of our goal of trying to replicate the work by Vohs and 
Schooler. Because they used an American sample, we used an American sample. Figuring out 
whether their work replicates in a non-American sample is a task for another day. That said, 
we would obviously welcome cross-cultural studies that implemented our paradigms to see 
whether our findings (or lack thereof) are cross-culturally stable.  
The third and final limitation of our experimental design concerns the possibility that 
MTurk participants may not be as attentive as in-lab participants, such that the manipulations 
we used may be less effective for the former than the latter. To guard against this possibility, 
we used an attention check in all of our studies and excluded any participants who failed it. 
We also used two items designed to encourage participants to pay attention by reminding 
them that they would be asked to write about the content of the vignette they read. While 
these measures can obviously not guarantee that participants are paying attention, we’d like 
to think that they reduce the likelihood of inattention. Additionally, many lab tasks that are 
particularly susceptible to lapses in attention have been replicated using MTurk populations, 
including tasks that depend on differences in reaction times on the scale of milliseconds (e.g., 
Erikson Flanker tasks) and memory tasks that are heavily attention-dependent (see Woods, 
et al., 2015 for a review).  
Setting these potential limitations aside, we nevertheless think we have made a 
valuable contribution to the literature on the relationship between free will beliefs and moral 




free will beliefs might undermine public morality. Future research on this front will have to 
take into consideration the difficulty of replicating both standard manipulations of belief in 
free will and the purported link between free will skepticism and morality. Contrary to our 
initial expectations, the association between free will beliefs and moral behavior appears to 
be highly elusive. As such, worries about the purported erosion of societal mores in the wake 
of recent advances in neuroscience are likely to be misplaced. The belief in free will appears 
to be more stable, robust, and resistant to challenge than earlier work suggests. While some 
scientists may think that their research undermines the traditional picture of agency and 
responsibility, public beliefs on this front are likely to be relatively slow to change. Moreover, 
even if beliefs about free will were to incrementally change, given the lack of association 
between dispositional free will beliefs and moral behavior reported by Crone and Levy (2018), 
it is unclear that people would have difficulty integrating such beliefs into a coherent 
worldview that permits the same level of moral behavior.  
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